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Abstract
We propose that human cognition consists of cascading cycles of recurring brain events. Each cognitive cycle senses the
current situation, interprets it with reference to ongoing goals, and then selects an internal or external action in response.
While most aspects of the cognitive cycle are unconscious, each cycle also yields a momentary ‘‘ignition’’ of conscious
broadcasting. Neuroscientists have independently proposed ideas similar to the cognitive cycle, the fundamental
hypothesis of the LIDA model of cognition. High-level cognition, such as deliberation, planning, etc., is typically enabled by
multiple cognitive cycles. In this paper we describe a timing model LIDA’s cognitive cycle. Based on empirical and
simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset
under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, and an action
selection phase 60–110 ms from the start of the conscious phase. One cognitive cycle would therefore take 260–390 ms.
The LIDA timing model is consistent with brain evidence indicating a fundamental role for a theta-gamma wave, spreading
forward from sensory cortices to rostral corticothalamic regions. This posteriofrontal theta-gamma wave may be
experienced as a conscious perceptual event starting at 200–280 ms post stimulus. The action selection component of the
cycle is proposed to involve frontal, striatal and cerebellar regions. Thus the cycle is inherently recurrent, as the anatomy of
the thalamocortical system suggests. The LIDA model fits a large body of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we
describe two LIDA-based software agents: the LIDA Reaction Time agent that simulates human performance in a simple
reaction time task, and the LIDA Allport agent which models phenomenal simultaneity within timeframes comparable to
human subjects. While there are many models of reaction time performance, these results fall naturally out of a biologically
and computationally plausible cognitive architecture.
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Introduction
Cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience aim at under-
standing and explicating human cognition. The extraordinary
complexity and interconnectivity of human cognitive processing
[1], taken together with the intricate interactivity of these
processes, cries out for the use of broad, comprehensive, integrated
cognitive architectures [2,3]. Such architectures have played an
ongoing major role in the development of cognitive science [3–6].
Hypotheses from such comprehensive, integrated architectures
serve to guide research in cognitive science and cognitive
neuroscience. As does human cognition, each of these architec-
tures performs via cyclic iteration of a collection of primary
processes.
We humans are confronted with a world full of action choices.
Using various cognitive processes, we have to decide what to do
next and thus answer what can be seen as the only question there
is: ‘‘What shall I do next?’’ (see Franklin’s Action Selection
paradigm [7]). In this way, every autonomous agent [8], be it
human, animal, or artificial, must frequently sample (sense) its
environment, process (make sense of) the input from such
sampling, and select an appropriate response (action).
In the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent) cognitive
architecture [8], with which we will be concerned here, the
repeated cycle of perception, understanding and action selection is
called a cognitive cycle. The same idea has been proposed in
similar form in different fields by different authors, for example the
action-perception cycles in neuroscience [8–12], the intentional
arc [13], or the recognize-analyze-synthesize cycle in systems
engineering [14].
The most important hypothesis put forth by LIDA is that such
cognitive cycles are the fundamental building blocks of all human cognition:
‘cognitive atoms’. Complex cognitive tasks, such as non-routine
problem solving, deliberation, volitional decision making, higher-
level perception or imagination, can require many of these cycles,
several of which can cascade as long as the seriality of
consciousness is preserved [8,15,16]. Within each cognitive cycle
a number of modules and processes operate, varying with the
current situation or task. The LIDA cognitive cycle is consistent
with many neuroscientific findings, as can be seen from the
evidence presented in this paper. If human cognition consists of
these cognitive cycles, as the empirical evidence strongly suggests
[17–24], it is imperative to find out as many details about the
operation of their modules and processes as possible. Our
description of the internal and external timings of such cognitive
cycles is an attempt to contribute to this goal.
In this paper we propose a timing model of the cognitive
processes humans employ from sensing to action selection, based
on recent neuroscientific findings. We will categorize such
processes into different stages within the scope of the LIDA
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them with relevant brain areas, and suggest ranges of how long the
processing in these brain areas could take (see Results section). We
will also compare our timing model with a few other influential
cognitive models (Section 3). Finally, we will introduce two
autonomous software agents based on the computational LIDA
framework [8]. The first agent performs simple reaction time
experiments and produces actions in times similar to human
subjects; and the second models phenomenal simultaneity within
timeframes comparable to human subjects. Both agents use
cognitive processes comparable to humans.
LIDA and Consciousness
The LIDA model is a comprehensive, cognitive model that,
with its computational architecture, covers a large portion of
human cognition. Based primarily on global workspace theory
[25], the model implements and fleshes out central ideas from a
number of psychological and neuropsychological theories includ-
ing situated (embodied) cognition [26,27], perceptual symbol
systems [28], working memory [29], memory by affordances [30],
long-term working memory [31], transient episodic memory [32],
and Sloman’s H-CogAff cognitive architecture [33].
LIDA’s cognitive cycle consists of multiple modules, which can
be partitioned into the three stages of the perception-understand-
ing-action cycle. The computational LIDA framework has been
almost completely implemented, and serves as a basis for the two
computational agents demonstrating the timings of the cognitive
cycle (see Results section).
As mentioned above, the LIDA model is based on the global
workspace theory of consciousness [25], which suggests the
existence of a fleeting memory capacity that enables access
between brain functions that are otherwise separate. The global
workspace theory (GWT) can be thought of as ‘‘… a theater of
mental functioning. Consciousness in this metaphor resembles a
bright spot on the stage of immediate memory, directed there by a
spotlight of attention under executive guidance. Only the bright
spot is conscious, while the rest of the theater is dark and
unconscious’’ [34]. In case of sensory consciousness, the stage
corresponds to the sensory projection areas of the cortex, its
activation coming either from senses or from internal sources.
After a conscious sensory content is established, it is distributed to
a decentralized ‘‘audience’’ of expert networks sitting in the
darkened theater. Thus, the primary functional purpose of
consciousness is to integrate, provide access, and coordinate the
functioning of very large numbers of specialized networks that
otherwise operate autonomously. In the neuroscientific study of
consciousness, this idea of consciousness having an integrative
function has proven very useful, and is supported by much recent
evidence [34–36] (see also the Results section).
In LIDA, every cognitive cycle can have only a single conscious
‘‘frame’’ (content) at a time, a hypothesis compatible with recent
neuroscientific publications which view consciousness as large-
scale phase synchronization of neuronal activity [37–40]. In this
view, the complex rearrangement of neural populations across
widespread and diverse cortical regions, which is required for
consciousness, is accomplished by oscillatory dynamics; specifical-
ly, by theta-gamma coupling between the neural populations (see
Figure 1 - from [38] with permission).
Performing cognitive tasks modulates oscillatory brain activity
in various frequency bands, including both the theta (4–7 Hz) and
gamma (30–150 Hz) bands. Gamma-band phase synchrony
(Figure 2) has been associated with perceptual binding and
awareness. Numerous studies have observed the occurrence of
gamma activity coherence with perceptual [41,42] as well as long-
term [43] and working-memory-related [39] object representa-
tions. Synchronized gamma-band oscillatory activity has also been
shown to play an important role in the coding of short-term
memory information [24,44,45]. Moreover, modulation of gamma
activity has been demonstrated in attentional selection [46-48],
and phase-locked gamma synchrony between ascending and
descending systems in a sensorimotor task [39]. Many of these
studies have observed that activity across different cortical columns
representing the percept of an object is gamma synchronized (e.g.
[42]). Thus, the neuronal ensembles responsible for various
cognitive processes involved in the processing of a percept, taking
place during a cognitive cycle, operate at and are integrated by an
internal oscillation frequency in the gamma band.
The construction of such gamma-synchronous neural ensembles
has been claimed to be governed by theta-rhythms [37,49]. This
might be the integration mechanism required for consciousness: in
this view, consciousness emerges from large-scale functional
integration of these gamma-synchronous ensembles that form
and dissolve at the theta frequency band [37].
Only one perceptual experience can be contained in a single
phase of theta-modulated gamma-synchrony [37], consistently
with the attentional blink ([50], see also Results section) and other
studies of perceptual synchrony [51]. This indicates that these
phases of synchrony define discrete ‘frames’ of consciousness,
which, in the LIDA model, correspond to cognitive cycles [16,38].
An approximate lower time limit for a single cognitive cycle can
already be deduced from this hypothesis. Since each cycle is
concerned with a single conscious content, and a new conscious
content requires theta-gamma synchronization, conscious process-
ing in the cognitive cycles has to occur at theta rates (4–7 Hz).
Therefore cognitive cycles have to take at least 140–250 ms.
However, since cognitive cycles can cascade as long as they
preserve the seriality of consciousness, they could take longer than
that (see Results section).
An important hypothesis of the LIDA model is the discreteness
of consciousness. Humans can only have a single conscious content
at a time, and there are short breaks between these periods of
consciousness. In the words of Franklin et al. [8], ‘‘conscious
events occur as a sequence of discrete, coherent episodes separated
by quite short periods of no conscious content’’ (see also [52]) -
similar to the frames of a movie, the ‘frames’ of consciousness are
discrete but are experienced as being continuous (although this
analogy is not entirely accurate).
This view is consistent with the idea of consciousness emerging
from theta-gamma coupling. Gamma-oscillatory neural ensembles
are synchronized as well as desynchronized at theta rates. The
transient periods of desynchronization, also called phase scatter-
ing, reflect unconscious processing in the brain, thus ‘‘ending each
‘frame’ of [conscious] perceptual experience’’ [37]. These periods
of desynchronization have also been observed, and pointed out, to
play a role in the transition from one cognitive content to another
by [51,53–56]. (For more neuroscientific results about conscious-
ness see the Results and Discussion section below). In psychology,
Stroud [57] was one of the first authors to propose the idea of
discrete frames or ‘moments’ underlying consciousness. His
‘Discrete Moment Hypothesis’ included two important underlying
assumptions: a) a complete loss of time-order information within
one conscious ‘moment’, and b) a distinct and non-overlapping set
of percepts for each ‘moment’. This strict view of discrete
consciousness has been regarded with some skepticism. Allport
[58], for instance, has conducted experiments on phenomenal
simultaneity, which seem to contradict the Discrete Moment
Hypothesis – they are, however, compatible with LIDAs
consciousness model, as can be seen from the Results section, in
Timing of the Cognitive Cycle
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e14803Figure 1. Theta-gamma coupling. Three gamma cycles are sequentially ‘‘embedded’’ in a theta cycle. (A), (B), and (C) depict the temporal activity
pattern of three different neuronal assemblies oscillating in the gamma range. Each is phase-locked to the underlying theta rhythm with a different
phase offset, as indicated by the dashed lines. This type of coupling is known as phase-amplitude coupling, because the amplitude modulation of
each gamma pattern is locked to a particular phase of the theta pattern (S).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g001
Figure 2. Phase synchrony between two oscillations. The upper part shows two oscillations (in red and blue), and the lower part their phase-
differences. In the two gray areas framed by dotted lines the oscillations are highly phase synchronous and the phase differences are low. Such
phase-synchrony in the gamma band has been proposed to be responsible for perceptual binding (for example, cortical columns representing the
same object are gamma synchronized).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g002
Timing of the Cognitive Cycle
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e14803which we replicated the data from Allport’s experiment using a
LIDA-based agent.
In the LIDA model, single conscious episodes are discrete but,
contrary to Stroud’s [57] view, not necessarily distinct – a current
conscious ‘moment’ can contain percepts from a previous
moment. Whether or not an older percept remains conscious
depends on how long in the past it has been perceived, and on
attentional modulation – percepts that are subjectively important
and attended to can persist longer in consciousness. To improve
our earlier movie analogy, the ‘frames’ of consciousness in the
LIDA model could be compared to a movie shown on a phosphor-
based electronic display (CRT): although the frames are discrete,
new images on the screen contain past information (see Figure 3).
As we will see in the Results section, this approach resolves the
empirical contradictions of the Discrete Moment Hypothesis.
Since our timing model was largely derived from neuroscientific
experiments, some tools and techniques these experiments might
use, and the reasons we preferred to use the results of some
experiments over others, should be described.
Electroencephalography (EEG) records electrical activity from
neural field generators using several electrodes placed on the scalp
surface. Recent research concentrates on aspects of this electrical
activity time-locked to events, i.e. event-related potentials (ERP),
which occur in preparation of or in response to discrete (internal or
external) events. We have used EEG experimental results because
EEG has great temporal resolution (on the order of milliseconds),
and a large number of EEG results are available. Disadvantages of
EEG are its low spatial resolution (typically 2–3 cm in surface
tangential directions) and the fact that it only measures synaptic
activity from superficial cortical layers [59].
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiments involve
stimulating the brain using induced electric currents, which trigger
action potentials in the neurons in the current field, disrupting
ongoing brain activity (causing temporary ‘‘virtual lesions’’). We
also used TMS experiments because TMS resolutions are very
good (temporal resolution on the order of milliseconds, spatial
resolution on the order of a few millimeters, depending on the coil
shape). Disadvantages of TMS are the impossibility to determine
exactly how much area is affected by these induced currents. Also,
TMS cannot stimulate regions deeper than the cortex without
stimulating the cortex.
The most exact technique measuring brain activity is using
depth electrode and subdural grid recordings. Depth electrode
recordings are mostly performed on animals and clinical patients.
Subdural grid recordings (also called electrocorticograms or
ECoG), involving the placing of electrodes directly on the brain
surface, are less invasive and have spatial resolution somewhere
between depth electrodes and EEG. These techniques provide the
Figure 3. Schematic comparison of the Discrete Moment Hypothesis (top) and LIDA’s discrete consciousness hypothesis (bottom).
The colored frames represent the temporal constraints of a perceptual moment or conscious ‘frame’, and the black rectangles symbolize incoming
percepts. In LIDA, important percepts from previous conscious ‘frames’ can remain conscious (rectangles left of the dashed lines in the coloured
frames in the bottom picture).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g003
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be used in healthy humans [39].
The reason we have not used experiments relying solely on
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data is that this
technique measures blood oxygen levels, and it takes several
minutes for the bloodstream in active brain areas to become
oxygenated [60], which is well outside our time scale.
A more complete and detailed review of non-invasive brain
imaging techniques can be found in [61].
The LIDA Cognitive Cycle
Autonomous agents [62] cope with their changing environment
by their continuous, cyclic chores of ‘perceive-understand-act’.
LIDA’s cognitive cycle [8] is the cycle of refined cognitive
processes (starting after sensation and ending with action) that
bring about the appropriate action for specific situation. As
Franklin and Baars [16] put it ‘A cognitive cycle can be thought of
as a moment of cognition - a cognitive moment; higher-level
cognitive processes are composed of many of these cognitive
cycles, each a cognitive atom.’ This metaphor is to say that the
steps in a cognitive cycle correspond to the various sub-atomic
particles in an atom.
Since the LIDA architecture is composed of several specialized
mechanisms, a continual process that causes the functional
interaction among the various components is essential. The
cognitive cycle as such is an iterative, cyclical, continually active
process that brings about the interplay among the various
components of the architecture. The steps of cognitive cycle are
shown in Figure 4 (Modified from [63]) and will be described below.
It is important to point out the asynchrony of the LIDA cognitive
cycle. Cycles can cascade as long as they preserve the seriality of
consciousness. Furthermore, the components of the cognitive cycle
described below should not be seen as serial stages of information
processing. The components operate asynchronously - although
coordinated, each component has its own internal mechanism and
agenda. Components receiving inputs from others are not
triggered by those inputs, but rather run continuously at their
specified frequencies of operation (See Methods section).
During each cognitive cycle the LIDA agent, be it human,
animal or artificial, first senses its environment and tries to
recognize familiar objects, individuals, etc (perception phase). It
then associates percepts with memories and other percepts and
decides what portion of this situation is most in need of attention
(understanding phase). Broadcasting this portion (bringing it to
consciousness) enables the agent to choose a number of actions
applicable for the current situation and to select the action best
serving its goals (action selection phase), and to finally execute the
selected action. The cognitive cycle has the following components:
1) Perception. Sensory stimuli, external or internal, are
received and interpreted by perception producing the beginnings
of meaning.
2) Percept to preconscious buffer. The percept, including
some of the data plus the meaning, as well as possible relational
structures, is stored in the preconscious buffers of LIDA’s working
memory (workspace). Temporary structures are built.
3) Local associations. Using the incoming percept and the
residual contents of working memory, including emotional
content, as cues, local associations are automatically retrieved
from transient episodic memory and from declarative memory,
and stored in long-term working memory.
4) Competition for consciousness. Attention codelets view
long-term working memory, and bring novel, relevant, urgent, or
insistent events to consciousness.
5) Conscious broadcast. A coalition of codelets, typically an
attention codelet and its covey of related informational content,
gains access to the global workspace and has its content broadcast
consciously. Thus consciousness solves the relevancy problem in
recruiting resources.
6) Recruitment of resources. Relevant schemes in Proce-
dural Memory respond to the conscious broadcast. These are
typically schemes (underlain by behavior codelets) whose context is
relevant to information in the conscious broadcast. Thus
consciousness solves the relevancy problem in recruiting resources.
7) Setting goal context hierarchy. The recruited schemes
use the contents of consciousness, including feelings/emotions, to
instantiate new goal context hierarchies (copies of themselves) into
the Action Selection system), bind their variables, and increase
their activation. Other, environmental, conditions determine
which of the earlier behaviors (goal contexts) also receive variable
binding and/or additional activation.
8) Action chosen. The Action Selection module chooses a
single behavior (scheme, goal context), from a just instantiated
behavior stream or possibly from a previously active stream. Each
selection of a behavior includes the generation of an expectation
codelet (see the next step).
9) Action taken. The execution of a behavior (goal context)
results in the behavior codelets performing their specialized tasks,
having external or internal consequences, or both. LIDA is taking
an action. The acting codelets also include at least one expectation
codelet whose task it is to monitor the action, bringing to
consciousness any failure in the expected results.
As shown in Figure 4, multiple learning mechanisms are
initiated following the broadcast of conscious content. In the
perceptual associative memory learning of new entities and
associations, and the reinforcement of old ones occur, events are
encoded in the Transient Episodic Memory, and new schemes
may be learned and old schemes reinforced in Procedural
Memory; in all of the learning processes, the conscious content
determines what is to be learned. For more information about the
LIDA model and its cognitive cycle see [8,16].
Results and Discussion
As mentioned above, cognition in autonomous agents [62],
whether artificial, animal or human, can be thought of as
consisting of repeated perception-understanding-action cycles. In
these cycles, actions can be external (effecting changes in the
environment) or internal (effecting changes in internal represen-
tations or processes). Similarly, perceptual information can come
from external (from senses sensing the environment) or internal
sources. Complex tasks may require many of these cycles before an
external action can be taken.
Figure 5 shows such a cognitive cycle, including its three sub-
processes. For the durations of these sub-processes, see Figure 6.
The understanding phase in this cognitive cycle is frequently called
‘cognition’ in other cognitive models (e.g. [64,65]). In LIDA, the term
‘understanding’ is more appropriate because the integration of
percepts, the building of associations (with memories and with other
percepts) and assessments of subjective significance that take place
during this phase all contribute to a representation or situational
model (stored in temporary memory, the workspace) which is best
described as the agents current understanding of its immediately
perceived environment (see Introduction). In other cognitive models,
such as ACT-R or EPIC, the cognition phase includes the matching,
selection and execution of production rules [64,65].
Figure 6 shows our hypothesized durations for the sub-processes
of the cognitive cycle in humans. The next subsections will
Timing of the Cognitive Cycle
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supporting evidence for the indicated durations. The indicated
ranges should not be taken as precise and definite values; rather,
they are working estimates derived from recent evidence.
It should be pointed out that the experiments on which these
durations are based used very simple settings and stimuli, and in
most cases, they did not involve memory recall. For tasks involving
the use of memory, the time from stimulus presentation to action
execution can be significantly longer than the times indicated here
[66]. However, for most simple tasks, due to the large extent of
consistency between these results and various psychological and
neuroscientific experiments (see below), we believe that the
indicated durations of these processes accurately reflect some of
the temporal properties of human cognition.
Perception
The perception process includes obtaining data from the
environment via sensors, detecting features, and recognizing more
abstract entities such as objects,events and categories.
In humans, perceptual information can come from different
sensory modalities. The most researched and perhaps most
complex modality (judging from the size of cortical areas
associated with its processing) is visual perception [67].
Visual perception starts with an image of the environment on
the photoreceptive cells of the retina, which produces neural
impulses that are transmitted along the retinofugal projection to
the visual cortex, which is located in the occipital lobe, where most
of the processing of visual information takes place [67].
We have estimated the duration of the perception process in
humans for simple tasks to be approximately in the range of
Figure 4. The LIDA cognitive cycle, and the durations of the perception, understanding and action phases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g004
Figure 5. The three phases of the LIDA cognitive cycle. A
stimulus comes in from the environment via the senses. The perception
sub-process includes obtaining this data, detecting features, and
recognizing objects, categories and events. The understanding sub-
process includes making sense of the perceived information and
selecting the most relevant, urgent or novel information, which is
included in the conscious broadcast (the agent is only consciously
aware of the contents of this broadcast). Finally, the action selection
sub-process selects the action best serving the agent’s goals, based on
the conscious broadcast contents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g005
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et al. [68], performed using intracranial electrodes in epilepsy
patients, has shown that object category information can be
decoded from neural activity in the occipital lobe as early as
100 ms poststimulus. This is consistent with EEG experiments
trying to temporally localize object-selective brain activity, most of
which found that the P100 ERP component (90–115 ms post
stimulus) is already associated with object information [69]. It is
also consistent with the result of various studies of visual processing
which have determined that a stimulus presentation time of
100 ms is sufficient for recognizing traits and properties [70,71].
Finally, this duration was also indicated by TMS experiments
investigating in which time range TMS interferences with the
visual system can impede vision. Such experiments found that the
range of greatest impairment was between 80 and 100 ms, and
that TMS interference after 100 ms had little to no effect on visual
perception [72,73].
This perceptual duration seems to provide an appropriate upper
limit for the perception process in general, since information from
other modalities is processed in this range or even faster in the
human brain. For example, auditory (and somatosensory) event
related responses in the sensory cortices can commence in less than
50 ms [74], and the entire auditory neural representation can be
built during the N1 stage in ,100 ms [75,76].
Cognitive Processing and Consciousness
According to the LIDA model and GWT (see Introduction), a
major functional role of consciousness is to distribute important
perceptual information to different, specialized brain areas. (Novel
Hypothesis 5 in [8]) It is possible to derive a way to measure the
elapsed time between the sensing of a stimulus and its becoming a
conscious event from this hypothesis. Unconscious processing of
the stimulus appears to be more localized in sensory areas (e.g. the
visual cortex for visual stimuli), meaning that these areas have the
highest activity in the unconscious processing stage. Conscious
processing can be said to start at the moment other brain areas, for
example those involved in decision making/action selection (e.g.
pre-frontal areas, see next section), become highly active – this
information can be derived from fast brain imaging techniques.
There are experimental indications that this distribution of
information, termed the conscious broadcast [16] commences
about 200–280 ms post stimulus (Figure 6).
For substantiating the claim of when conscious processing starts,
comparisons of conscious and non-conscious processing of the
same stimulus are sometimes used. There are a number of such
neuroscientific experiments that yield useful timing results from
this point of view. Gaillard et al. [77] have conducted an
intracranial iEEG experiment using a visual masking procedure,
performing trials with and without conscious visibility of masked
words (with and without showing a mask very shortly after
presenting the word), concluding that conscious processing takes
place 200–300 ms post stimulus. Other studies using EEG and
also using a masked visual paradigm indicated conscious
processing to commence at 270 ms [78,79] (see also the survey
about conscious and unconscious processing in [36]). An MEG
study using a different visual paradigm (subjects had to decide
whether a cue – a faint circular grating – has been present or
absent during stimulus presentation) concluded 240 ms post
stimulus as the onset of awareness-related activity [80]. A different
MEG study yielded similar results, for both auditory and visual
conscious perception of novel words [81].
Another approach to determining the onset of conscious
processing is by calculating the amount of theta-gamma phase
synchrony from brain oscillatory data (see Introduction).
A binocular rivalry experiment using EEG recordings conduct-
ed by Doesburg et al. [37] provides supporting evidence for this
hypothesis. Doesburg et al. found that gamma-oscillatory networks
across the brain, formed and dissolved at the theta frequency
band, are time-locked to perceptual switching (they are time-
locked to which of the two stimuli the subject is aware of). On a
spectral diagram of their results they could identify the times in
which the subject was aware of one or the other stimulus, signified
by high levels of theta-gamma phase synchronization. The
resulting time until one of the stimuli became conscious was
260–380 ms (the temporal distance between the subject being
consciously aware of the first and then the second stimulus).The
lower time limit is consistent with a previous experiment by the
same authors [55], which observed maximal phase synchrony
220–280 ms post stimulus. It is also consistent with the iEEG,
EEG and MEG studies described above.
The so called ‘‘Visual Awareness Negativity’’ (VAN), an ERP
component defined by the difference between ERPs to conscious
versus unconscious stimuli, also fits well into these time ranges,
since the part of VAN that is affected by attentional selection
occurs at 200–260 ms [82].
Finally, all the results above are to some extent consistent with
the time frame of the attentional blink [79,50]. In attentional blink
experiments, two masked visual stimuli are presented in short
succession. For short stimulus onset asynchronies, the identifica-
tion of the first target hinders the detection of the second target
Figure 6. The timing of a single cognitive cycle. The perception sub-process is estimated to take P=80–100 ms, the time until conscious
processing C=200–280 ms, the action selection sub-process A=60–110 ms, and the entire cognitive cycle is hypothesized to take D=260–390 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g006
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between the two targets is increased). The worst identification
performance of the second stimulus has been observed at delays of
about 225 ms between the onsets of the two stimuli [50], which is
consistent with the LIDA hypothesis that there can be only one
conscious content in one cognitive cycle [8,16]. This idea is also
described by Doesburg et al., who write that after one period of
phase synchronization (of the subject being conscious of a
stimulus), desynchronization is required before the next period
of synchronization; and that during one period of synchronization
the subject can be conscious of only one stimulus [37].
It should be pointed out that for determining the time of the
conscious broadcast, only the lower limits of the times determined
by these experiments are relevant. Cognitive processes after the
times indicated by the upper limits in these experimental results
presumably include action selection processes (see next section).
Therefore, the time range of the conscious broadcast indicated in
Figure 6 has been determined by taking into account only the
lower limits of these results: the smallest and the greatest lower
limit.
Summarizing, consciousness seems to involve large-scale
integration of different brain areas through phase coupling, and
widespread distribution of sensory information. In simple trials,
conscious processing has been estimated to commence C =200–
280 ms post stimulus (see Figure 6).
Decision Making/Action Selection
There are several brain circuits involved in action selection, the
most relevant being the prefrontal cortex, the pre-supplementary
motor area (preSMA), the supplementary motor area (SMA) and
the primary motor cortex (M1). Information from the first three
areas converges on the primary motor cortex (see Figure 7 - from
[83], with permission), which executes motor commands by
transmitting them to the spinal cord and muscles [83]. There
can be two classes of inputs to M1, voluntary and stimulus-driven
inputs.
The first key input comes into the M1 from the prefrontal cortex
by way of the basal ganglia and the preSMA - see the left panel in
Figure 7. This circuit is used when making voluntary actions
(preSMA activations are stronger for voluntary actions than for
stimulus-driven actions).
The second input plays a role in the immediate stimulus-
dependent guidance of actions and is projected to M1 from the
lateral part of the premotor cortex, which receives its input from
the internal representations in the parietal lobe, which in turn are
built from information from the sensory cortices (although this
circuit also contributes to voluntary behavior) [83] – see the right
panel in Figure 7.
The action selection process begins with receiving the conscious
broadcast (Figures 5 and 6), and involves two stages:
N the selection of a number of actions that are applicable,
depending on the current situation, i.e. the content of the
conscious broadcast (represented by the Procedural Memory
module in LIDA) and
N the selection of the best available action, i.e. the action that
best serves the goals of the agent (represented by the Action
Selection module in LIDA).
This separation of action selection into two stages has also been
observed in the brain. The brain begins to prepare several actions
in parallel while collecting evidence for selecting between them
[84,85]. For example, in visually guided movement, the first stage
involves a reciprocally interconnected network of areas in the
posterior parietal and caudal frontal cortex, converting sensory
information into parameters of potential actions. Each area can
represent information that is simultaneously pertinent to several
potential actions. There is a competition between these potential
actions, corresponding to stage two mentioned above, which is
Figure 7. Major brain areas involved in action selection. The left panel shows the brain areas involved when making voluntary actions; the
right panel, object-oriented (stimulus driven) actions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g007
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ganglia and the prefrontal cortex (for more details see [84]).
There are few experimental results concerning the duration of
the action selection process; some of them shall be reviewed below.
In an experiment conducted by Nachev et al. [86], subjects were
asked to either follow a specific movement plan or to choose freely
between two alternatives in an oculomotor change-of-plan task.
After free choice, subjects could be asked to continue their plan or
to rapidly change it. Directed trials in which subjects failed to
change their planned saccade had latencies 107 ms (median)
shorter than trials where the plan change was successful, indicating
that the process of selecting a different action took 107 ms.
Taylor et al. [87] have used TMS to interfere with preSMA
activity, which disrupted subjects’ decision whether they should
respond with their left or right hand, if applied in the time window
between 180 and 300 ms. Since awareness of a stimulus is a
prerequisite of making a conscious decision, the time until the
conscious broadcast (200–270 ms, see previous section) can be
subtracted from this window, yielding 20–90 ms as the duration of
the action selection process.
Philiastides et al. [88] conducted an EEG experiment where
subjects had to do a perceptual decision making task, deciding
whether there was a face in the shown stimulus (faces in the stimuli
had different coherence levels). They found brain activity strongly
correlated with the subjects’ decision 300 ms post stimulus. They
also identified a component at 220 ms the strength of which
systematically increased with task difficulty, to which they have
assigned the top-down influence of attention (which is consistent
with other experiments dealing with attention and consciousness).
Subtracting these two times yields an action selection duration of
80 ms.
van Rullen and Thorpe [65] have also conducted an EEG
experiment involving a go/no go task with presented visual stimuli
(depicting vehicles or animals). Resulting median reaction times
were around 350 ms, but they also showed that categorization
could be performed above chance after 250 ms (which therefore
constitutes the start of the decision process) – implying a duration
of ,100 ms for decision making (action selection).
An MEG experiment by Bauer et al. [89], requiring subjects to
perform a simple reaction time task, found high gamma band
activity between 200 and 250 ms poststimulus and suggestested a
role of this oscillatory activity in crossmodal integration,
consistently with the conscious broadcast times described in
Section 2.2. In this experiment, average reaction times were
279.1 ms. Subtracting the lower bound of high gamma activity
from the reaction time yields 79.1 ms required for both the
selection of an action and its execution. It is important to point out
that reaction time experiments measuring actual motor responses
include both the times of the cognitive cycle sub-processes, and the
time for motor execution (which is not included in the described
cognitive cycle). The time of the propagation of action potentials,
from the motor cortex to evoking hand muscle responses, takes
about 20 ms (motor response was evoked 19–24 ms after TMS
stimulation of the motor cortex in an experiment by Capaday et al.
[90]; which is consistent with the axonal conduction delays of
motor neurons [91]). Motor execution can therefore be said to
take around 20 ms. This time has to be subtracted from the results
of these mechanical reaction time experiments to obtain the
cognitive cycle duration. Thus, the action selection part in the
experiment of Bauer et al. can be said to take approximately
60 ms.
In the neural action selection circuit described above, we have
included not only the selection of an action, but also the selection
of the appropriate motor command executed by the motor cortex.
These low-level motor commands –information about which
muscles or actuators have to be used to implement a specific action
– are stored in the Sensory-Motor Memory component in the
LIDA model and are chosen after the action selection process.
Choosing the exact low-level motor command to use takes a short
amount of time in addition to the time taken for action selection.
For example, when a person in a restaurant is faced with the
decision whether to reach for a glass of wine or a glass of water, his
or her brain needs to decide first (select the action) and then
choose a low-level motor command (i.e. choose which muscles
have to be flexed to reach and grasp the correct glass). The
Sensory-Motor Memory has not yet been computationally
implemented in LIDA; however, for the simple agents described
below, this does not make a difference.
Summarizing, the process of action selection or decision making
has been indicated to take 60–110 ms.These times constitute a
lower range for the action selection duration in humans, since they
were obtained in studies using very simple settings – action
selection may very well take longer if the task is more complex.
(The 20 ms lower boundary that has been deducted from the
Taylor study [87] has been disregarded because it is an outlier
compared to the results of other studies).
Comparison with Psychological Reaction Time
Adding up the durations of the cognitive processes mentioned
above yields a total duration of 260–390 ms for a single cognitive
cycle (Figure 6). This is on the order of most reaction time
experiments from psychology (although slightly longer than most
simple reaction time experiments and slightly shorter than most
choice task experiments).
The reaction times of young adults has been proposed to be in
the range of 190–220 ms [92]. Results from this and other
reaction time experiments include the time taken for motor
execution, which was not included in our discussion of the
cognitive cycle above, and can be said to be around 20 ms (see
previous section).The time of the propagation of action potentials,
from the motor cortex to evoking hand muscle responses, takes
about 20 ms (motor response was evoked 19–24 ms after TMS
stimulation of the motor cortex in an experiment by Capaday et al.
[90]; which is consistent with the axonal conduction delays of
motor neurons [91]). Subtracting this delay, the cognitive cycle
duration in these experiments can be inferred to be around 170–
200 ms, which is comparable to the lower limit of the cognitive
cycle duration described. For choice tasks, reaction times are in the
range 356–400 ms if there are two choices [93], which is very close
to the upper limit of the proposed cognitive cycle duration.
For more substantial reaction time data, and a more complete
survey of reaction time experiments, see [66].
Comparison with other Cognitive Models
The adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R) model,
developed mainly by Anderson [64], which is a symbolic cognitive
architecture aiming, like LIDA, to explain how the components of
the mind work together to produce coherent cognition. Coordi-
nation of the ACT-R modules is achieved by a central production
system (using production rules). The production system architec-
ture as well as the timing model in ACT-R is very similar to the
Executive Process/Integrative Control (EPIC) architecture [65].
Both ACT-R and EPIC processes can be split into the
perception, cognition and action sub-processes. ACT-R proposes
a duration of 85 ms for the perception process, based on an
interpretation of psychological experiments [64]. In EPIC, this
time is slightly shorter (50 ms). The time taken by the perception
process and the cognition process is 185 ms in ACT-R (150 ms in
Timing of the Cognitive Cycle
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and in EPIC. It is important to point out that the action sub-
process in ACT-R and EPIC only involves the actual motor
execution (unlike our usage of the term, which included obtaining
all applicable actions and selecting the appropriate one – these are
performed in ACT-R’s/EPIC’s cognition process).
The Model Human Processor (MHP) proposed by Card, Moran
& Newell [94], was an influential cognitive model of human task
performance, used to calculate how long it takes to perform a
certain task. Card et al. have achieved a good fit of their model to
the experimental results from different tasks. Similarly to ACT-R
and EPIC, MHP has perception, cognition and action stages. In
the original MHP model, perception has been proposed to take
100 ms (with a range of 50–200 ms, depending on the task). The
perception and cognition processes together take 170 ms (range:
75–370 ms), and the action process 70 ms (range: 30–100 ms).
The comparison of these timings with our timing model
described above is illustrated by Figure 8. The next two sections
will introduce two concrete implementations of agents based on
the LIDA model, and compare their performance with human
psychological experiments.
The LRT Agent
A computational framework of the cognitive cycle described in
the introduction has been partially implemented [95].
We have developed two autonomous software agents based on
this framework, the LIDA Reaction Time (LRT) agent, perform-
ing a simple reaction time experiment; and the LIDA Allport
Agent, replicating a psychological experiment regarding the
continuity of conscious ‘moments’ (see next Section).
The first implementation, the LRT agent, repeatedly performs a
reaction time experiment in a simple environment consisting of a
light (which can be red or green), and a button (which the agent
has to press as quickly as possible when the light turns green).
Figure 9 contains a screenshot of the LRT agent. A description of
how the LIDA computational model was adjusted for this specific
Figure 8. A comparison of the phase timings in LIDA, ACT-R
and MHP.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g008
Figure 9. A screenshot of the LIDA Reaction Time Agent. The left top panel contains information about the environment (whether the light is
red or green and whether the button is pressed) and statistics about the agent’s performance (the last and the average reaction time). The right top
panel contains internal information (shown here: the contents of PAM, i.e. the PAM nodes for the red and the green light, and their activations).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g009
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empirical data, can be found in the Methods section.
Figure 10 shows the LRT agent’s performance at the simple
reaction time task over 30 trials. As can be seen from this figure, the
cognitive cycle durations of the LRT agent (283 ms) are comparable
to the cycle durations inferred from the reaction times of adult
humans (200 ms according to [92]; see also discussion in the Decision
Making/Action Selection subsection), although slightly larger. The
main reason forhumansbeing faster at such experimentsisthe effects
of temporal expectation (which has not yet been implemented in
LIDA). Humans seem to engage cortical action circuits (inferior
parietal and premotor areas) prior to perceiving the stimulus [96],
and can thus reduce the time required for action selection after
stimulus presentation. Still, the reaction times of humans and of the
L R Ta g e n ta r ec o m p a r a b l e( t h ed i f f e r e n c ei sa r o u n d4 0 % ) .
The LIDA Allport Agent
Allport [58] has conducted an experiment comparing two
competing consciousness timing models. Stroud’s [57] Discrete
Moment Hypothesis, states that consciousnessis comprised of distinct
and non-overlapping conscious ‘moments’, within which all time-
order information is lost, while the Continuous (Traveling) Moment
Hypothesis considers conscious ‘moments’ to correspond to contin-
uously moving segments of the incoming sensory information.
Allport’s results clearly contradict the strict Discrete Moment
Hypothesis. LIDA’s discrete consciousness mechanism, however,
is consistent with this empirical evidence.
We have successfully replicated Allport’s experiment computa-
tionally with three goals in mind:
N to show that our discrete consciousness model, based on
neuroscientific evidence, does not contradict empirical data -
unlike the Discrete Moment Hypothesis (see also the section
‘‘LIDA and Consciousness’’ above),
N to strengthen the claim that LIDA’s GWT-based consciousness
mechanism models human functional consciousness (note: in
an artificial agent we refer to functional consciousness [97],
rather than phenomenal consciousness), and
N to substantiate the plausibility of the timing parameters
proposed in this paper by showing the similarity of the LIDA
Allport agent’s behaviour and timing to actual human data.
In Allport’s experiment, subjects were seated in front of an
oscilloscope screen, which displayed a single horizontal line,
appearing in one of 12 positions on the screen. This line rapidly
changed position, moving upward. Upon reaching the topmost
position, the screen was left blank for the same duration as the
line took while traversing all 12 positions, and then the line
appeared again on the bottom position – see Figure 11 (the same
visual effect could have been achieved if the line had moved over
the whole screen in 24 positions, but with the bottom half of the
screen covered). The rate of stepping, and thus the cycle time (t),
was controlled by the subject. At very large cycle times, subjects
could see the single line jumping from position to position. Upon
decreasing t, they reported seeing multiple lines, moving
together. At a specific cycle time S and below, subjects reported
seeing a stationary array of 12 lines flickering in synchrony (see
Figure 11).
The subjects had to arrive at the cycle time S, where they did
not perceive any movement on the screen. In separate trials
subjects first decreased the cycle time from a very high value (slow
to fast), and then increased it from a very low value, at which all
lines were seen simultaneously (fast to slow). Both times were
recorded for each subject. These times were then compared to the
predictions of the two hypotheses about consciousness.
According to the Discrete Moment Hypothesis, there are two
cycle times at which all 12 lines appear to be on the screen: at
t=S, at which the complete cycle falls within one conscious
‘moment’, and at t=S/2, at which conscious ‘moments’ con-
taining all lines and no lines alternate (and thus the condition of no
movement being perceived is met) – see Figure 12. The cycle time
at which subjects will stop, perceiving no movement, will thus be S
when decreasing t, and S/2 when increasing t. A significant
difference between these two conditions is predicted.
The Continuous Moment Hypothesis predicts that successive
events are perceived to be simultaneous whenever, and as long
as, they fall within the temporal constraints of the conscious
Figure 10. A histogram of the LRT agent’s performance at the reaction time task. The blue bars represent the reaction time in single trials.
The figure shows n=30 trials; the average reaction time is 283 ms. The dashed blue line is LRT’s average reaction time; the dotted black line
represents human reaction time (200 ms, see Decision Making/Action Selection subsection).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g010
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momentary simultaneity but perpetual absence of perceived
movement, there can be only one cycle time S at which this
criterion is met (see Figure 12). There should be no difference
between trials decreasing or increasing t.
In [58], twelve subjects performed two versions of this
experiment under both conditions:
A) the half screen experiment described above, with
1. decreasing the cycle time until no movement was perceived
2. increasing the cycle time; and
B) the full screen version of the experiment (where the 12
positions were distributed over the entire screen and the line
immediately appeared again on the bottom of the screen
after reaching the end of the cycle, without delay)
1. decreasing the cycle time and
2. increasing the cycle time.
Table 1 displays the resulting cycle times averaged over all
subjects (data from [58]). It is clear that the difference between
increasing and decreasing trials is not significant (and certainly not
close to S/2), which contradicts Stroud’s Discrete Moment
Hypothesis.
The results from the simulation of these experimental conditions
by the LIDA Allport agent are shown in Table 2 below. The data
matches Allport’s results – there is only one cycle time threshold S
at which the agent does not perceive any motion. Despite the high
standard deviations of Allport’s data, and the as yet imprecise
estimates of LIDA’s internal parameters, it can be seen from this
experiment that the timing data of the Allport agent is comparable
to human performance.
Methods
The Implemented Cognitive Cycle
Both agents are based on the almost completely implemented
computational LIDA framework, which provides extendable basic
implementations for all modules in the LIDA cognitive cycle
(Figure 4). These implementations have been extended to allow
Figure 11. The display and conscious percept in Allport’s experiment. t denotes the total cycle time. At cycle times t .S, subjects could see
multiple lines moving together (left panel). At t=S, subjects saw all lines simultaneously and perceived no movement (right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g011
Figure 12. The predictions of Stroud’s (1955) Discrete Moment Hypothesis for the Allport experiment. There are two cycle times at
which no movement is perceived (t=S and t=S/2). Depending on whether the subjects have to increase or decrease the cycle time, they should
encounter one or the other. A difference of S/2 is predicted between the two trial types.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.g012
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timing parameters have been adjusted to fit the empirical evidence
described above.
To illustrate how the agents implementations work, we shall
describe in this section what happens in each of the modules of the
LIDA cognitive cycle outlined in the Introduction; specifically:
1. Sensory Memory
2. Perceptual Associative Memory








N (the 3 modules above are part of the ActionSelection phase)
There are two additional modules in LIDA’s cognitive cycle
(Transient Episodic Memory and Declarative Memory) which will
be omitted here since they are not required in these experiments.
For this simple domain, no visual image processing is necessary.
The environment class, which contains and controls the sensory
stimulus (and the button), is inspected periodically by the Sensory
Memory module. The LRT agent’s sensory stimulus consists of a
single red (or green) light, while the Allport agent’s has 12 distinct
lines which may or may not be alight.
Simple feature detectors monitor their respective fields in the
Sensory Memory, and activate relevant Perceptual Associative
Memory (PAM) nodes if they find corresponding sensory data.
This is comparable to the human visual system, which also makes
use of feature detectors – for example, V1 contains neurons that
are sensitive to features such as orientation, direction and spatial
and temporal frequency, and V4 neurons are sensitive to
geometric shapes [67]. In the LRT agent, the single color-sensitive
feature detector activates the PAM node representing a red light or
a green light, depending on Sensory Memory contents. In the
Allport agent, there are 12 feature detectors sensitive to their
respective lines, which activate one of the twelve respective PAM
nodes upon sensing their line.
Next, the percept (consisting of the identified PAM nodes) is
moved into the Workspace, which constitutes LIDA’s precon-
scious buffers of working memory. The LRT agent does not use
episodic memory, but in the LIDA model, episodic memory
contents would be retrieved to the Workspace as well (from the
Transient Episodic and Declarative Memories), cued by the
percept.
According to Global Workspace Theory, on which LIDA is
based, conscious contents reside in a memory capacity that enables
access between brain functions that are otherwise separate (see
Introduction). In LIDA, this memory capacity is the Global
Workspace, and its role is enabling the Procedural Memory and
the Action Selection access to the most urgent/novel/relevant
Workspace contents. These contents are transferred into the
Global Workspace by Attention Codelets (codelets are special
purpose mini-agents implemented as a small piece of code running
on a separate thread). These codelets look for their specific
concerns in the Workspace and, upon finding it, copy it to the
Global Workspace.
An agent is consciously aware
1 of an object, represented by
PAM nodes, the moment these nodes become part of the
conscious broadcast (after winning the competition against other
contents of the Global Workspace).
Finally, an appropriate action is selected based on the contents
in the broadcast. This selection is performed by two components
in LIDA. The first component is Procedural Memory, from
which all behaviours applicable in the current situation are chosen.
In the LRT agent, as well as in the Allport agent, there are two
possible behaviors (pushing the button, and releasing the button/
doing nothing). Note that behaviors could be more complex (they
could include many actions) in a more complex domain of
application.
The second component is Action Selection, in which the
action best serving the agent’s goal is selected. In the agents
described here, this process is trivial – since in all possible states of
the environment there is only one applicable action, the
Procedural Memory always yields only one action, which only
has to be forwarded by the Action Selection component (without
competition between actions) to the Sensory-Motor Memory
for execution. This selected action is then executed in the
environment (e.g. the button is pressed). The simple mechanism
responsible for this could be called the LRT agent’s ‘‘actuator’’.
Parameters
As do other computational architectures modeling cognition,
LIDA contains a multitude of internal parameters that have to be
adjusted for a computational agent acting as subject in the
replication of an experiment. Such parameters may include decay
rates for various types of memory, a threshold above which a
perceptual item becomes part of the current percept, or a
parameter that makes action selection more goal-oriented rather
than opportunistic. The ultimate goal is a tuned set of internal
parameters whose values remain constant when a number of
disparate datasets are reproduced. Such a tuned parameter set
assures the accuracy and usefulness of the model. Inability to find
such a tuned parameter set should warn that the model needs
revision. The particular parameters that resist such tuning will
Table 2. The LIDA Allport agent’s cycle times at which the
agent did not perceive movement (n=12).
Cycle times t [ms]
LIDA Allport agent 1. (decreasing) 2. (increasing)
A (half screen) 96 96
B (full screen) 84 84
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.t002
Table 1. Average cycle times at which subjects did not
perceive movement in Allport’s experiment (n=12. s denotes
the standard deviation).
Cycle times t [ms]
Human subjects 1. (decreasing) 2. (increasing)
A (half screen) 95,5 (s=16,0) 81,4 (s=14,6)
B (full screen) 86,2 (s=12,5) 70,7 (s=8,1)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.t001
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need revision. This parameter tuning provides a metric for
assessing the quality of a cognitive model as a basis for
understanding the cognitive processes responsible for the behavior
of the agent.
Successfully accomplishing this goal will provide substantial
evidence of the accuracy and usefulness of the conceptual
cognitive model. Cognitive hypotheses from the model can then
be tested by experiments with human subjects to see if their data is
predicted by running artificial subjects in the same experimental
situations. If so, we will have shown the ability of the theoretical
model to predict as well as to explain.
The timing parameters described in this section are a first step
in the direction of a well-tuned parameter set for the LIDA model.
Each module in LIDA has a specific task (see module
descriptions above) that has to be executed at least once every
cognitive cycle. The module tasks are run in a parallel and
asynchronous fashion - like the human brain, which does not use
sequential information processing, but, rather, local neural circuits
which run in parallel.
In the computational framework, all of these module tasks are
executed periodically to implement the LIDA cognitive cycle. The
execution intervals are governed by ‘ticks’ parameters. These
parameters govern in how many ‘ticks’ (simulated milliseconds) a
particular task will be executed.
Adjusting these ‘ticks’ parameters, so that the timings of the
resulting LIDA cognitive cycle become comparable with the
timings of the human action-perception cycle (and, thus,
neuroscientifically plausible) was the main purpose of the
development of the LRT agent.
The most important parameters resulting from this parameter
adjustment are listed in Table 3 below. It is important to point out
that the modules corresponding to these parameters do not run in
a serial manner - the LIDA model aims for the highest possible
asynchrony. The only points in the cognitive cycle where seriality
is enforced are the conscious broadcast and the action selection
process (the selection of a behavior can only start when the
contents of the global workspace become conscious).
The first parameter governs how often the contents of the
Sensory Memory are updated, i.e. how often the environment is
sampled. This would be a domain specific parameter that must be
found anew for each LIDA controlled agent implemented.
The second parameter controls how often feature detector
codelets are run, detecting features depending on their speciali-
zation. Feature detection is very rapid in the LRT agent, as in
humans. V1 neuron response latencies start at 30 ms – [98,99].
Also, a presentation time of 20 ms is required for simple go/no go
classification for visual stimuli – [100]. In other experiments,
30 ms was required – [101]. This is also consistent with V1 firing
rates, which peak at about 45 spikes per second [102]. In the LRT
agent, there are only two Feature Detectors, which detect the color
of the light stimulus (one for red and one for green). Upon
detecting their corresponding light stimulus, these Feature
Detectors pass activation to the corresponding nodes in the
Perceptual Associative Memory. If the activation of the updated
PAM node exceeds a specific threshold, then a copy of this node is
instantiated in the Workspace (LIDA’s preconscious working
memory).
The next important timing parameter (number 3 in Table 3)
governs how often the attention codelets are run. Attention
codelets are mini-agents that have the purpose of bringing novel,
relevant, urgent, or insistent events to consciousness (i.e. bringing
instantiations of their corresponding PAM nodes, or other
Workspace structures, to the Global Workspace). Since we have
argued that the onset of conscious processing in humans starts at
about 200 ms (see Results), this parameter was set to this value. It
is important to point out that the conscious broadcast can have
multiple triggers. In more complex domains, the broadcast is
triggered whenever the cumulative activations of the coalitions
built by Structure Building Codelets exceed a specific threshold.
The broadcast can also be triggered if a single coalition exceeds
another threshold. Both of these thresholds can be interpreted as
contents judged novel or important enough being brought to
consciousness. Finally, a broadcast is sent automatically if too
much time has passed since the last broadcast has commenced.
The idea is to allow the conscious processing of less important
information in cases when there is no current novel or vitally
important content in the Global Workspace (instead of an
extended unconscious period that would last until one or more
coalitions exceed the activation threshold again). The time at
which this trigger is activated, measured from the onset of the last
conscious broadcast, is controlled by Parameter 4 (NoBroadCas-
tOccuring Trigger) and was set to 200 ms, the onset of conscious
processing in humans, as well.
In the domain of the LRT agent, there is only a single coalition
in the global workspace (containing a PAM node representing a
red or a green light). A conscious broadcast is automatically
triggered whenever the activation of this coalition exceeds a
specific threshold. The timing parameters of the Attention
Codelet, and those of the perception process, have been chosen
in a way that the broadcast happens in the range of 200–280 ms
(the range for the onset of consciousness in humans – see the
Cognitive Processing and Consciousness Section).
The final parameter (number 5 in Table 3) governs the
frequency of the process that leads to the selection of an action.
The ‘ProceduralMemory Ticks’ parameter controls how often the
set of actions that are applicable in the current situation is
retrieved and the actual best action selected. This parameter has
been set to 110 ms, the upper limit of the duration of action
selection (see Results). As in humans, the duration of the action
selection phase will depend on task complexity (especially, on the
number of available actions). Since the implementation of the
Procedural Memory and the Action Selection components in
LIDA are still being worked on, the internal timings of this action
selection phase have not yet been determined. But both of these
processes have to be rescheduled at intervals longer than the
internal processing time they require, to avoid bottlenecks, which
is why parameter 5 has been set to the upper limit of the action
selection duration described in the Results section. In the current
LRT agent implementation, these processes take a very short
amount of time; and are rescheduled periodically at intervals
indicated by parameter 5in Table 3. For future agents, an
improved action selection mechanism based on [103] is in
development, which will involve the use of triggers (triggering
the selection of the best action, for example, if at least one of the
Table 3. The LRT Agent’s most important timing parameters.
Parameter name Value [ms]
1. Sensory Memory Ticks 20
2. Feature Detector Ticks 30
3. Attention Codelet Ticks 200
4. NoBroadcastOccurring Trigger 200
5. ProceduralMemory Ticks 110
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014803.t003
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of periodic action selection.
Figure 10 in the results section shows a diagram of the resulting
reaction times of 30 trials performed by the LRT agent. For the
results of the Allport agent see Table 2 and the previous section.
Although setting these parameters and pointing out consistent
results does not prove either the cognitive cycle hypotheses or the
correctness of our timings, this parameter adjustment has to be
done as a prerequisite of building more complex LIDA agents,
because the cognitive cycles will have to run at a speed comparable
to human cognitive cycles if we expect them to model human
cognition (or an aspect thereof). If a number of such LIDA agents,
replicating different psychological experiments and thus focusing
on different aspects of human cognition, would operate in time
frames consistent with the human brain (without readjustments of
internal parameters), this would considerably increase the
plausibility of the LIDA architecture as a model of human
cognition.
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